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Somalia is trapped in a maliciously rancorous and senselessly 
violent history where all fire exit signs lead to the same cul de 
sac of clan-based injustice. The lack of sustained intellectual dis-
course on the fundamental cause of the state’s failure, on why 
the quadrennial electoral shenanigans produce similar incom-
petent and corrupt “leaders” as before, and what might be the 
most viable way out of the current vicious cycle only maintains 
the dreadful status quo or sets the stage for worse. And since 
Somalia’s challenge seems unique, search for answers compels 
one to turn every stone including Holy Scriptures. 
As someone who does not subscribe to the prevalent ana-
lytical method that arbitrarily excludes historical events, and 
refrains from incorporating specific narratives or transforma-
tional figures simply because their narratives were prominently 
highlighted in the Qur’an or the Bible, this author came to accept 
that Somalia is going through a Teah period of its own. Teah is an 
Arabic word describing the forty years of aimless wandering in 
the desert that was imposed on the children of Israel for break-
ing God’s covenant.1
Somalis could learn a lot from that period and the triumph 
and glory that ensued after people took ownership of their 
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shortcomings and repented; after they changed their attitude 
or their outlook from within. But before delving further, let me 
first say a few things about the ever-morphing Somali political 
conundrum and its volatility. During the past thirty years, many 
articles, essays, and books were written about the fratricide and 
subsequent political disharmony and fragmentation in Somalia; 
but seldom about how to solve this ever-morphing problem.  
This brief essay will attempt to unpack the complex issue at 
hand and propose a viable strategic option to end the hopeless 
clan-based fragmentation trajectory. 
II. Language Influence of External Predators
If one’s action is determined by one’s interest and frame of mind 
and if all political entities are made of assortments of individ-
uals of mutual interests, the growing attitude in certain circles 
that the end of the transitional period (Aug 20, 2012) is “Xilligii 
kala guurka” or “Time to part-ways” ought to be a matter of great 
concern. In a clearly coordinated effort to inculcate certain atti-
tude of apathy toward nationhood and de-synthesize certain 
nationalistic sensitivities, the said phrase became the motto of 
most politicians, traditional elders, media groups, and some of 
the “intellectuals.” Make no mistake, language matters; espe-
cially in politics.
These are primarily front-line states such as Ethiopia and 
Kenya who may have certain security related concerns, whose 
political gaming intentions are thinly veiled. States and free-
wheeling predators are motivated by opportunities for zero-
sum advantages. They use conventional armies, mercenaries, 
intelligences, and individual political hit-men of various levels 
to manipulate the clan balance of power in certain regions to 
advance their own strategic or proxy geopolitical objectives.
III. Mercenaries and Influence of the Ghost-lords:
The biggest problem, and ironically the seldom discussed among 
the many facing the Somali government, is regulating their con-
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duct or keeping these contractors in check, especially now that 
the international anti-mercenary laws are all but defunct. As it 
was proven in Sierra Leone and other parts of the world, these 
kinds of contractors operate with great impunity while they 
engage in various outlawed operations such as illegal mining, 
arms trafficking, and serving as a proxy war machine in favor of 
foreign interest groups or in favor of one domestic contender or 
another. Since 2007, the international community has been fed 
the narrative that the presence of AMISOM troops is critical for 
the security of Somalia whereas the presence of these troops and 
various foreign mercenary security-related outfits in Somalia 
may actually be making security more precarious in this fragile 
war-torn country. 
As I argued in an old essay entitled “Insecurity in Somalia: Is 
Mogadishu’s Green Zone Part of the Problem?” broken nations 
like Somalia that require intervention from the international 
community require a safe area where diplomats and other offi-
cials representing key governments and organizations could 
be hosted. Hence Somalia’s heavily guarded “Green Zone,” or 
Halane as it is commonly known. As a compound dominated by 
African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) soldiers, mostly 
from Uganda, and a network of guerilla diplomats who respect 
no diplomatic boundaries and which is infested with “economic 
hitmen,” foreign intelligence, counter-intelligence, counter-in-
surgency and counter-stability (mercenaries) agents, Halane 
became a mega bazaar for political exploitation and zero-sum 
trade. Twelve years after becoming the artificial nerve center of 
Somali politics, it became clear that Halane needs to undergo a 
detoxification process in order to serve its original objective: to 
help Somalia re-emerge as a nation-state capable of protecting 
itself and running its own affairs.
Today, though various training sessions in security and gov-
ernance take place inside the Halane compound, it is where the 
carrots are dangled to co-opt Somali officials and where sticks 
are wagged so that the self-confident among them are psycho-
logically broken down until they accept behaving like guests in 
their own country. It is where the elite with political ambitions 
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are required to go to get their blessings and a few power-project-
ing pictures for social media. It is where resolutions that under-
mine Somalia’s central government authority and legitimacy are 
concocted despite the fact that Somalia’s transition period ended 
in 2012.
 
IV. Domestic Profiteers and Corporate Freeloaders:
The former are men who, through their fluid businesses or 
“NGOs,” callously exploited the lawlessness of the past three 
decades, and the latter are unregulated business conglomerates 
that grew exponentially in the past two decades. While all are 
presumably in legal businesses, none have been paying taxes or 
have on their own been assisting in provision of public services.
A few mega “corporations” such as Hormuud and Dahabshil 
practically own the entire country. Over the past two decades, 
these companies, especially those in the telecommunication 
business who are granted exclusive right to use the official gate-
way and country code without paying licensing fees or taxes, 
have been investing in keeping business as usual. It is an open 
secret how these mega companies co-opt key political actors by 
bringing them on board as stakeholders or through kickbacks to 
sustain their silence. Meanwhile, the old lady selling tomatoes 
under the scorching sun is routinely harassed by the municipal-
ity to pay her “public service” dues.
V. Jubbaland Puntland Enigma and Beelstan Politics:
During the electoral related political rancor of recent months, two 
of the five regional governments known as federal-states have 
openly declared that they do not recognize Mohamed Abdullahi 
Farmajo whose term ended February 9th as the nation’s Presi-
dent. They defiantly rejected a number of proposals and invi-
tations extended by the Somali President. They accused him of 
political hypocrisy and malicious intent to “poison them.” Being 
under the same clan umbrella along with President Farmajo, the 
accusation made by Ahmed Islam of Jubbaland and Said Deni 
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of Puntland have exacerbated the a crisis and deepened distrust 
of other clans, though this latest matter is more complex than 
the conventional clan politics as both are deeply intertwined 
with foreign powers--Jubbaland with Kenya and Puntland with 
United Arab Emirates. 
These elements have ignited vicious discord and armed skir-
mishes that ultimately led to the de facto siege of Villa Soma-
lia—the presidential palace—with four different clan militias 
camping in strategic areas with a stone throw distance from The 
Villa. Since Somalia never had a genuine reconciliation, the polit-
ical situation still remains volatile and combustible as ever. The 
residue of a toxic mix of beel (community) politics—euphemism 
for clan-based distrust—frustration emanating from electoral 
process manipulation, divided loyalties to competing foreign 
interests, and the central government’s illegal interference in the 
federal states’ almost ignited a new civil war. 
In late April, gunfire erupted across Mogadishu as “security 
forces loyal to the president clashed with units that appeared 
to have sided with his rivals, stoking fears that Somalia’s sim-
mering political crisis is spilling over into violence. The fight-
ing, some of the worst in the Somali capital for years, followed 
months of tense talks between President Mohamed Abdullahi 
Mohamed (Farmajo) and opponents who accuse him of making 
an unconstitutional power grab.”2 This was a rude awakening 
to many politicians, intellectuals, activists, and other Somali 
political actors who relentlessly used to ridicule any suggestion 
that Somalia still needs a genuine reconciliation. That violent 
episode that brought Somalia to the edge of renewed civil war 
underscored the perilous fickleness of the current trajectory to 
reconstitute the Somali state.       Though things have been get-
ting better, it is no secret that clannism still remains the most 
vibrant ideology that fuels the Somali political machine. Clan-
nism is a vicious zero-sum game that continuously fragments 
the Somali society. Regardless of how abundant resources are, 




The last four decades underscored Somalia’s lack of foresight. 
The society has proven to the rest of the world that Somalis 
might be  individually competent but collectively inept. And 
that, precisely, is the nature of clan politics. Clan politics’ pre-
eminent dysfunction is highlighted in its inability to pause and 
ponder what might be in the collective best interest. Beelstans are 
fueled by the social and political drama of the moment.  
VI.  Law of the Land, AMISOM and Sovereignty:
If constitution means a social contract that clearly outlines the 
demarcation of authority and who has the legitimacy to exercise 
and execute power, and how the law supersedes all governmen-
tal politics, Somalia does not have one. What Somalia has today 
is a mock document known as provisional constitution without 
the right court (constitutional or supreme court) that possesses 
the exclusive right to interpret laws outlined in the constitu-
tion and others resulting from judiciary rulings. In a nutshell, 
Somalia’s constitution has been in a transitional developmental 
process since 2012.
At the dawn of this century, the legendary geopolitical strat-
egist and the lightning rod of foreign policy controversy, Henry 
Kissinger, wrote: “Africa’s civil wars and ethnic cleansing should 
be left largely for African nations….The industrial nations could 
assist by supporting the creation of an intervention force drawn 
from African nations. A center for training in African peace-
keeping missions could be created where American and Euro-
pean advisors could assist the projected African force.” This, of 
course, has paved the way for the so-called “African solutions 
for African problems” that include three frontline states--Ethi-
opia, Kenya, and Djibouti.3 As is clear in Somalia, this kind of 
politico-military model–especially when neighboring states are 
directly involved–may solve a problem by creating others that 
perpetuate dependency, exploitation and subjugation.
“When one asks a powerful neighbor to come to aid and 
defend one with his forces…These forces may be good in them-
selves, but they are always dangerous for those who borrow 
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them, for if they lose you are defeated, and if they conquer you 
remain their prisoner,” forewarned Niccolo Machiavelli many 
centuries before Kissinger’s locally romanticized concept.4 The 
only substantive progress toward viable statehood or reconsti-
tuting that collective identity that Somalia made in the past four 
decades is this: from chasing winds to chasing mirages.
A country is not sovereign if it fails to fulfil its obligation to 
protect its citizens and all others living in the geographical ter-
ritory that is within its domain of authority from domestic and 
foreign threats. 
Meanwhile, conspicuously declared in one of the top clauses 
of every UN Security Council resolution on Somalia are these 
shallow words: “Reaffirming its (UNSC) respect for the sov-
ereignty, territorial integrity, political independence and unity 
of Somalia…” Granted, no state is wholly sovereign as such 
sovereignty belongs only to The Almighty. However, states can, 
and should, have claim to sovereignty. That is the highest polit-
ical authority within certain negotiated or legally defined geo-
graphical territory accepted by the United Nations. This type of 
sovereignty is necessary to establish the rule of law, to govern 
independently, to protect the nation’s values, resources, territo-
rial integrity, unity, and to mobilize for defense against internal 
and external threats.
VII. The Man of the Moment:
Joshua son of Nun was Moses’ assistant and protégé who was 
mentioned in the Qur’an, The Cave Chapter or Surah Al-Kahf 
when Prophet Musa (Moses) was on his journey to meet the one 
man who had more knowledge than he--Khidr is the Islamic 
tradition. 
His name in Hebrew is Yehoshua. And in Arabic or the Islamic 
version of the same figure is known as Yush’a Ibn Nun. As the 
trustworthy, humble young assistant and protégé of Prophet 
Mosses--a man with unwavering trust in the will of God and 
promises.  Joshua is revered in Islam as a faithful, brave, vision-
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ary young leader and indeed a great strategist.  Joshua’s history 
is covered more broadly in the Hadith tradition.5
Somalia needs a new paradigm of leadership--a transformative 
leader with a vision, strategic plan, prudent pragmatism, moral 
conviction, and selfless ethos to lay down the foundation for a 
modern state that serves and upholds its citizens’ constitutional 
rights. 
A leader who could earn the trust and respect of those he is 
to lead. One who inspires them and affects their attitudes and 
outlooks and challenges them to seek new beneficial aspirations 
and to reach higher.
There are certain universal values that we collectively learn 
from the Teah: The importance of faith in God--that He will fulfill 
His promises and He will only assist those who make the first 
attempt to assist themselves. Secondly, we learn the importance 
of discipline--gaining certain competencies and knowledge 
requires certain trainings, practices, obedience and codes of con-
duct, accountability and retribution to deter abuses. Third, we 
learn the importance of transformative leadership. In addition to 
faith, vision, and strategy, the transformative leader must appre-
ciate the importance of hope and having sense of optimism that 
there is a way out of the current state of despair. That leader 
must have the patience with the process. Every farmer knows, 
between sowing and harvesting there is a process of various 
lengths.   
VIII. Conclusion
Among the principle objectives that drive the establishment of a 
new state are: 
1) Creating a safe space for a polity that shares specific geo-
graphical territory.
2) Preservation of a communal identity- race, religion, history, 
and future aspiration.
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For Somalia to reinforce these principle objectives, it must 
take steps backward before taking steps forward. Currently, the 
political entity known as Somalia is a web of competing and 
counter-competing interests and predatory scams. To untangle 
and sift through all these mostly existential threats requires a 
moratorium period to administer the shock therapy that it so 
desperately needs to survive as a nation.
Every fourth year, the so-called Somalia political, social and 
intellectual elite ignore the fact that political polarization erodes 
trust, and without trust there cannot be cooperation for the com-
mon good to save and defend the nation. Good politics is the art 
of converging various interests into foundational grand inter-
est--patriotism--to preserve sense of nationhood or Soomaalin-
imo.  Without trust, all pathways lead to a failure. The most 
existentially critical question facing the nation is: How can we 
reconstitute a new and a viable state? I do not think another 
four year term of a new or an old face will get Somalia out of the 
current dilemma. Somalia needs radical transformation and that 
demands leadership with radical vision, strategy and the will to 
swim against the current political tide. And such leaders must 
be cultivated.
In an article entitled “A Shock Therapy for Somalia,” this 
author proposed a controversial counterintuitive option: Current 
state of affairs is such that: foreign sponsored national reconcilia-
tion has been a periodical ritual since year 2000. The completion 
and ratification process of the transitional (provisional) consti-
tution that already costed over $60 million has been on-going 
since 2004. The periodical U.S. aerial bombardments have been 
on-going since 2007 and are now intensified to bi-weekly deadly 
drones. AMISOM (including Ethiopia & Kenya with direct con-
flict of interest) has been fighting al-Shabaab since 2007. The 
Somali national army has been under a never-ending process 
of rebuilding since 2004 while Somalia still remains under UN 
arms embargo. Furthermore, the balkanization process of Soma-
lia into clan-based political entities; each with its own foreign, 
defense, and immigration policies, so to speak, has been on-go-
ing since 1991. Each of these entities is ruled by an Alpha clan 
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that claims exclusive or zero-sum rights over all other clans. 
And each is founded or sustained by a hate narrative.
Somalia is already in a muted or a “stealth trusteeship” in 
which U.K. still remains the country’s pen-holder or the official 
gate-keeper of all Somalia related issues at the UN Security 
Council. Granted, the formal trusteeship system was established 
to help the Trust Territories (former colonies) attain the capacity 
for self-determination and self-governance. This is good so 
long as there is a trustee willing to help in capacity-building 
and a trustee council providing the necessary supervision and 
scrutiny. Once the UN Security Council agrees to such proposal, 
a friendly country with proven goodwill toward Somalia will be 
invited to serve as a trustor for a period of 4 years.2 In so many 
different ways—political, economic, educational, and in capac-
ity building—Turkey has proven itself being a loyal strategic 
partner.  
The Somali government should establish serious strategic dia-
logue with Turkey and appoint a permanent commission made 
of thoroughly vetted credible and visionary men and women 
with no political ambition that may undermine their role of 
maintaining the continuity of relationship and administering 
the critical oversight needed during those four years. Painful, 
ego-wounding, and vanity-shattering as it may seem, that offi-
cial and transparent humiliation maybe the precise condition to 
level the playing field and expose clan-based false narratives of 
superiority and equally debase all alpha clans in perpetual zero-
sum clan competition. Today, Somalia is at a worse predicament 
than before independence six decades ago.
It is the only way to streamline the multilayered Somalia’s 
domestic and foreign problems; the only way to form an inde-
pendent reconciliation commission that is not funded and 
framed by foreign powers. It is the only way to genuinely nego-
tiate a constitution that sidelines all forms of clan-based rights 
in favor of citizenship rights and cultivate the right leadership 
to transform Somalia into a viable state. Today, we are where 
we were before, facing the same perilous volatility. “ Still the 
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average Somali sees his/her government as the archetype of 
power abuse, the magnet of demagoguery, the personification 
of partisanship, the agents of disunity, the epitome of incompe-
tence, the exploiters of resources, the executioners of injustice, 
the promoters of corruption, the purveyors of propaganda, the 
distorters and manipulators of nationalism….” Ironically, when 
I wrote these lines there was no Nabad iyo Nolol or Peace & Life--
the party currently in charge. 
As this essay is being written, there is a fierce political row 
between President Farmajo and Prime Minister Mohammed 
Hussein Roble that is being played out in the public’s sphere. 
It was triggered by Roble’s decision to replace Farmajo’s right 
hand man and enforcer — Director of the National Intelligence 
Service Agency (NISA), Fahad Yasin—over a murder investiga-
tion of a young female intelligence officer—Ikraan Tahlil—and 
the agency’s seeming cover up. This latest development comes 
at a time of heightened tensions due to the aforementioned 
cliffhanger of inter-clan violence.  I shall conclude, then, with a 
reminder that resilience is a state mind. It is the willingness to 
rise above adversities and misfortunes by consciously managing 
or changing one’s outlook and attitude.
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